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1 Summary 
The Learning Event brought together colleagues from DFID, IDS, and the BRICS, and aimed 
to facilitate the sharing and learning of experiences in international development and policy, 
from and amongst the BRICS, and to set out a framework and broad parameters for 
engaging with the Rising Powers in the future. 
Presentations from DFID colleagues in the BRICS countries and London office showed that 
DFID policymakers are concerned with finding structures that allow the UK to address the 
challenges of working with new development actors – e.g. non-DAC donors and the BRICS 
countries – particularly in the post-Busan context, where the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee is seen to no longer hold the same sway. At the same time, DFID seeks to share 
its extensive experience and expertise as a donor and partner in technical development 
cooperation. How do we capitalise on the good relationships the UK has with other nations to 
implement development processes and action in a new and as yet undefined space? 
The feedback from participants from the BRICS showed similar concerns exist, particularly in 
terms of the need for wider and more transparent domestic consultation processes, as their 
countries (re)engage in international development. The consensus was that DFID may 
achieve greater impact in future development coordination and cooperation with the BRICS if 
the focus is primarily on technical and thematic engagement. This would provide an entry 
point for working towards an eventual consensus around the role and place that political 
issues such as governance, democracy, and human rights should take in development 
assistance. 
The proposed Future Policy Development Network was discussed as offering an 
intermediary – and much more politically neutral – space for some of these issues to be 
discussed by policymakers, academics, researchers, and civil society from the Rising 
Powers, the UK, and other development actors. 
Two key points emerged during the week-long RPID workshop; and in particular during the 
DFID Learning Event: the need for the BRICS and other Rising Powers to manage 
inequality, and the need to systematise learning from their experiences in development 
and poverty reduction. 
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2 Objectives 
The Learning Event aimed to facilitate the sharing and learning of experiences in 
international development and policy, from and amongst the BRICS; and to set out a 
framework and broad parameters for engaging with the Rising Powers in the future. 
Specifically, the objectives were to: 
 familiarise IDS Fellows and Rising Powers’ researchers and policy analysts 
with key areas of DFID/HMG interest ahead of the UK G8 Presidency; 
 help key DFID policy leads to identify areas where engaging with Rising 
Powers can help to deliver departmental priorities; 
 identify key areas for future DFID–FDPN dialogue, both globally and in 
specific countries/policy sectors; 
 frame the scoping, evidence review and policy analysis work that IDS and 
partners will be undertaking under the Accountable Grant ‘Engaging with 
Rising Powers’ component [formerly ‘Emerging Powers’]. 
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3 Introductory session 
The DFID Learning Event was opened by Lawrence Haddad (IDS Director), Richard 
Manning, (Chair of the Rising Powers in International Development [RPID] Advisory Council), 
and Anthony Smith (Director of the DFID International Relations Division). 
Lawrence Haddad presented some of the challenges posed by the Rising Powers, 
representing a great power shift in the world, and which give rise to a number of fundamental 
questions: 
 There is a need to reconsider the metrics that we use to think about the 
‘Rising Powers’. 
 Indicators such as GDP per capita are not necessarily the most important. 
 How did these countries emerge as powers? 
 Was this consistent with conventional notions and discourses on 
development? 
 What are the mutual learning opportunities for international and national 
development processes? 
 What does this multipolar distribution of power offer as an opportunity for: 
o Multilateralism 
o Cooperation around global public goods, and 
o For collective action? 
He concluded that answering these and other questions requires collaborative and sustained 
inquiry, adding that IDS is very pleased that DFID has engaged in this process, which will 
contribute to rethinking international development. 
Richard Manning focused on the way forward within this changing global context. The world 
is in the midst of a rapid economic and social transformation, in which the role of the BRICS 
countries is fundamental, but rising influence and rapid transformation taking place 
elsewhere in the world must also be considered. He pointed out that the transformations in 
Africa are particularly relevant: rapid economic growth is accompanied by rising inequality, 
which poses a difficult challenge in tackling extreme poverty. He sees this as the real issue to 
be considered: how to tackle the problem of inequality? How can we make progress and 
advance towards a sustainable future? Richard Manning highlighted themes of potential 
interest, as well as priorities for learning, research and policy: 
 governance and accountability; 
 articulation of markets; 
 agricultural development; 
 conflict resolution; 
 shifting development paradigms. 
He concluded that as new actors engage in international development cooperation, other 
actors must also begin to think of the ways in which the new dynamics and spaces for 
cooperation will work. This will require a lot of work on policy, but also on implementation, 
which could come from a constructive collaborative partnership with DFID. 
DFID Director Anthony Smith’s speech is transcribed below. 
It is a very exciting time to be involved in this work, as we are living through a period 
of paradigm shifts, a time of changing power, roles and responsibilities, and evolving 
leadership. Countries are following different paths for development, and playing 
different roles in the international arena, changing structures and frameworks (for 
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example moving from G8 to G20). DFID is at the right moment to understand, adapt 
and take advantage of these changes. However, in many aspects, it still functions 
through a traditional structure, centred on bilateral programmes largely with low-
income countries (LICs), grant instruments and work based on targets around the 
Millennium Development Goals. While DFID has clear knowledge of [this] changing 
[global] architecture, there is still no clear guideline on the direction to take. DFID has 
to evolve and adapt. While it’s good that DFID has a specific strategy and programme 
in relation to the role of the Rising Powers, its ownership and impact across its work is 
not clear, nor is the operationalisation of these changes. The crucial thing for DFID at 
present is to learn and understand the significance of the shift we are experiencing, 
identifying the relationships which will be important, the frameworks to be used, and 
the central challenges to consider. Managing partnerships and learning to work with 
each other will be fundamental. While we may have formed good relationships 
working with G20 countries, we haven’t established structures and processes to 
structure these relations and take action. This is an opportunity to establish these 
formal spaces. 
3.1 Challenges: Programmatic, political, and philosophical 
Laura Kelly (DFID) presented a general overview of the UK’s perspectives on engaging with 
the Rising Powers, which was followed by teleconference presentations from DFID 
colleagues in the China, India and South Africa country offices. They gave an overview of the 
development cooperation work they do, describing priority issues, the main challenges and 
key questions for discussion. The workshop participants from the BRICS countries did the 
same, and the floor was then opened to a group discussion with IDS, DFID and other 
colleagues present. 
A detailed table of all the issues discussed during the Learning Event is given in Annex 1. 
3.2 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: 
What next? 
The discussion often returned to what  if anything  the new Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation means for the future of development cooperation and the 
inclusion of new actors (e.g. the BRICS) in development cooperation. It is hoped that the 
formation of the Busan Partnership’s secretariat and working groups will make advances 
towards establishing a new modus operandi that can reconcile the differences between how 
‘traditional’ OECD DAC and non-traditional, non-DAC donors operate. In the meantime, DFID 
policymakers are concerned with finding structures that allow the UK to address the threefold 
challenge of working with non-DAC Donors such as the BRICS: programmatic, political, and 
philosophical, as Chris Chalmers (DFID China) put it. At the same time, the new partnership 
seeks to share its extensive experience and expertise as a donor and partner in technical 
development cooperation. How do we capitalise on the good relationships the UK has with 
other nations to implement development processes and action in a new and as yet undefined 
space? In the vision of Anthony Smith, Director of DFID’s International Relations Division, 
‘the Rising Powers in International Development programme can help establish these formal 
spaces’. 
The feedback from BRICS participants showed that similar concerns exist, particularly in 
terms of the need for wider and more transparent domestic consultation processes, as their 
countries (re)engage in international development. The consensus amongst the BRICS 
participants seemed to indicate that DFID may achieve greater impact in broaching future 
development coordination and cooperation with the BRICS countries if this is done primarily 
in terms of technical and thematic engagement, and used as a platform and entry point for 
working towards some manner of consensus around political and ‘philosophical’ issues such 
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as governance, democracy, and human rights, for example. In the meantime, the proposed 
Future Policy Development Network could offer an intermediary – and much more politically 
neutral – space for some of these issues to be discussed by policymakers, academics, 
researchers, and civil society from the Rising Powers, the UK, and other development actors. 
All the participants agreed that the main challenge was learning/sharing lessons on 
development widely. While it is evident that DFID has considerable expertise in facilitating 
the sharing of technical ‘models’ or practices, this is only a small part of learning from a 
country’s experience, be it in social protection, agriculture or industrial upgrading. 
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4 Knowledge and evidence 
Two key points emerged during the week-long RPID workshop; and in particular during the 
Learning Event: the need for the BRICS and other Rising Powers to manage inequality, and 
the need to systematise learning from their experiences in development and poverty 
reduction. These two challenges permeated discussions ranging from policy diffusion 
mechanisms through to sustainable practice in private sector investment in Africa. 
The BRICS and other Rising Powers play a fundamental role in the current rapid economic 
and social global transformation, where double-digit growth is frequently accompanied by 
rising poverty and inequality. Managing this inequality is seen as one of the key challenges to 
policymakers in ‘emerging economies’. Countries such as Brazil, China and India have made 
significant advances in reducing poverty domestically through the implementation of social 
protection programmes, although results are still highly uneven, as outlined in many 
participants’ presentations (Huo Jianguo, CAITEC; Rajesh Tandon, Advisory Council/PRIA; 
Rômulo Paes, Advisory Council/RPID Senior International Associate; and Zhang Xiulan, 
Beijing Normal University). Furthermore, there is often mixed support for international 
development given significant development challenges at home, as highlighted by Sachin 
Chaturvedi (RIS India), Yuriy Zaytsev (HSE), and Huo Jianguo. 
4.1 Learning from the BRICS 
As the BRICS become more active players in international development cooperation, it is 
increasingly evident that a systematised approach is required in what is variously called 
‘policy transfer’, ‘policy diffusion’, or even the ‘exporting’ of social policy ‘models’. As Rômulo 
Paes described, the learning gap is partly technical, but also political – understanding the 
interests behind coalitions building support for financing of universal health systems, or social 
protection programmes, is an entirely different process from the solid monitoring and 
evaluation systems required to learn from the design and implementation of the initiatives. 
The country presentations from the DFID Policy Advisers (Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa) showed a number of shared challenges and areas of work, focused on the 
comparative advantages of being a bilateral partner, and how to best support policy dialogue 
for international development as well as knowledge transfers, ‘emphasising the evidence of 
practice and bringing it into policy-making’ (Karen Mahy, DFID India). 
4.2 Understanding Social Change 
As pointed out by many of the participants (Zhang Xiulan, Rosalind Eyben, and Rajesh 
Tandon), taking a historical approach is also key to understanding the confluence of factors 
that led the BRICS to be classed as ‘emerging’ or ‘rising’ powers and actors in international 
development. What were the roles of decentralisation, civil society, grassroots activism, 
political actors, and market forces in building a context that allows for Brazil’s Bolsa Família, 
or India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), South Africa’s Treatment 
Action Campaign, or the Western China Development Project? Bianca Suyama (Articulação 
Sul, Brazil) and Anuradha Chenoy make it clear that understanding the multifaceted roles of 
civil society in challenging and influencing the establishment is key when studying policy 
formation and diffusion. 
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5 DFID plenary session 
The DFID Plenary Session was chaired by Richard Manning, chair of the RPID Advisory 
Council, and concluded the half-day learning event held with DFID and other partners on 3 
May 2012. Further to the morning’s opening session, presentations and discussion on the 
‘view from the BRICS’ via DFID offices and the RPID workshop participants, three parallel 
discussions were set up, covering the following themes. Summaries of each session were 
presented by the chairs of the three groups and can be found below. 
 Group A: International development cooperation policy. 
 Group B: Learning from the BRICS – implications for successful policy transfer 
to low-income countries. 
 Group C: Understanding the Rising Powers’ development footprint in Africa. 
5.1 Group A: International development cooperation policy 
Chaired by Richard Manning, this session asked how we should look at the current changes 
in international development cooperation architecture. 
 Some formal spaces and some ‘limbo’ spaces outside of these were identified. 
 Within the formal spaces, important changes are being pressed, notably at the 
2012 BRICS Summit in Delhi, where the BRICS committed to important global 
architectural changes. 
 Other changes include the recent appointment of the new head of the World 
Bank. 
 The relevance of the G77 was debated with some uncertainty as to how 
movements in the system should be read. 
 Concerns were expressed over getting environmental/development actors to 
move towards a more coherent approach and shared agenda at Rio+20. 
 There was some discussion around whether the green economy is an end in 
itself or a means towards genuinely sustainable development? 
 The G20 was mentioned but did not figure greatly in the discussion, although 
it’s importance to the broader debate is clear. 
5.1.1 Post-Busan implementation group 
The discussion on the Post-Busan Implementation Group led to some emergent 
observations, questions and recommendations. 
 Emphasis should be on country-level work with international work carried out 
by a ministerial group every two years. 
 Work on building block activities, promoted by a ‘coalition of the willing’. 
 There should be flexibility in proposed architecture. 
 Are the Rising Powers/BRICS participating sufficiently in the process? 
 The international development community should take advantage of the New 
Deal for Fragile States and the BRICS Summit to confirm the BRICS’ interest 
in the security agenda 
5.1.2 Post-2015 agenda 
The post-2015 scenario was debated in the context of it potentially becoming an important 
area for cooperation among Rising Powers. Karen Mahy (DFID India) suggested India is not 
really focused on this debate, raising some concerns regarding which actors are actively 
involved and invested in the post-MDG space. 
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The group discussed how the quality of the BRICS international cooperation efforts might be 
leveraged and agreed pressure from the OECD DAC was not the best way of addressing this 
issue. Other points included: 
 the need for some form of peer review among Rising Power donor countries; 
 potential cooperation among Asian donors like Japan and Korea; 
 the importance of considering other donors, such as Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Middle Eastern countries; 
 better impact evaluation and knowing whether/how development cooperation 
programmes work is key. 
There was much interest as to whether civil society organisations in the Rising Powers will 
become involved in international cooperation activities. This is currently not the case since 
national CSOs are principally focused on the domestic context. There is a forthcoming study 
from Oxfam India that examines this issue in depth. 
The group stressed the need for some kind of position paper from Rising Power 
governments which would form the basis for development cooperation. The DAC-produced 
Effective Aid Management – 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews document was cited as a 
useful source when thinking about the design and implementation of a legislative framework 
for development cooperation. Andrew Norton (ODI) focused on how the economic crisis in 
the northern hemisphere has been an important factor in shifting these North–South 
dynamics. 
5.2 Group B: Learning from the BRICS: Implications for 
successful policy transfer to LICs 
This session was chaired by Gerry Bloom (IDS), and opened with Zhang Xiulan, Beijing 
Normal University: 
Why are we all here today? This is a golden moment in China, which is creating a 
welfare state which offers opportunities to be involved in the process and contribute 
actively to the discussion. 
Dr Zhang then summarised some of the points the BRICS have in common. These countries 
have experienced rapid social and economic change, but face major problems in inequality 
and high expectations from populations wanting a share of this growth. Changes in social 
policy have essentially been focused on meeting these demands. The problem is how to 
operationalise universal entitlement in countries with such shortfalls. Another aspect that 
characterises the BRICS is the heavy pressure on national governments, analysts, and 
researchers, who are all exclusively focused on solving these problems. 
What way forward? Professor Zhang suggests the first step is to look for synergies, and 
share experiences with other countries where the government is already engaged 
domestically. The speed of change has been so great that there’s been no time to reflect on 
what has been done, be it in Brazil, India or China. The partnerships proposed through the 
RPID programme provide the opportunity to reflect on these processes and share lessons 
learned and cases of good practice. 
How do we bring together civil society, academics and government? If these processes go 
through official channels the pace of change is likely to be slow, thus it’s important to find 
mechanisms such as the space offered by RPID, which might allow for this sharing to take 
place. 
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While there has been much discussion of general issues of global governance, the BRICS 
are focused on their internal problems, so it may be best to focus on these as entry points, 
based on similar perceptions and interests. For example, there are practical issues in 
extending coverage on health that could be a more effective basis for building mutual 
understanding on a given issue. 
5.3 Group C: Understanding the Rising Powers’ development 
footprint in Africa 
Chaired by Merle Lipton, member of the Advisory Council, the session opened with 
participants discussing the impact of BRICS involvement in international development in 
Africa, and how this is measured. How do we address the often poor availability and quality 
of data available on Africa? Addressing this gap is key in seeking to understand the Rising 
Powers’ development footprint in Africa. 
In relation to impact, the moral authority of the Rising Powers’ presence in international 
development would rest on what they achieved in the African continent. The Rising Powers’ 
offer of international development cooperation to African countries gives them greater 
leverage that may have broken with the ‘aid cartels’ of traditional donors in the region. 
How differently do the BRICS and Rising Powers operate when compared to the OECD DAC 
countries? In this question of comparative performance, it was immediately pointed out how 
heterogeneous each country is. At the same time, this raised the question of similarities 
between some of the BRICS and OECD countries. There is evidently a need to analyse each 
actor separately: 
 Which of the relationships are marginal and which were important? 
 How are they important to each other? This needs to be broken down by 
industry, sector and geography. 
The role of private capital from the BRICS was discussed in light of the criticisms levied by 
Mozambique against certain aspects of corporate behaviour from Brazil and China, seen as 
similar to the behaviour of OECD countries. This led to wider questions regarding the 
accountability and codes of conduct for businesses, large and small. 
The fear of the BRICS being seen as a neo-colonialist presence was debated in the context 
of the debate in South Africa about the need to train the labour force and build infrastructure 
to develop in-country processing capacity, ensuring profits remain in South Africa, rather 
than simply exporting raw materials to China, for example. 
Li Xiaoyun highlighted the importance of considering the political aspects of the BRICS’ 
engagement in Africa, as well as the technical. This led to Janis van der Westhuizen arguing 
for outside pressure on the South African government on its legislation on media and the 
judiciary – ‘the UK and other “Western” countries have taken a highly politicised stance which 
has in turn generated resentment in South Africa’. This raises the wider question of what 
unites and divides BRICS: united in relation to non-interventionism and sovereignty, but 
divided on human rights, as seen in Zimbabwe. 
Finally, each of the BRICS is very important in its own region, and is keen to strengthen and 
assert its regional footprint and institutional structure – this was particularly striking in the 
presentation from DFID South Africa. 
DFID concluded that much has been learnt on good and bad practice, but more work is 
needed on learning from these lessons in order to avoid past mistakes. 
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Concurring that many of these issues are familiar to those who work on the Rising Powers, 
Laura Kelly (DFID) outlined some interesting points to consider: 
Post-Busan agenda: the Rising Powers have made a lot of effort to engage with this, and all 
agree about the importance of a more coherent development policy. 
Post-MDG/Post-2015 agenda: this space is going to be fundamentally shifted, and key 
players will be very different. 
 Engaging with Rising Powers will be crucial. 
 Can DFID help them constructively engage, even if Rising Powers are 
currently not interested? 
 BRICS don’t have clear development policy engagement structures. 
 How to learn systematic lessons and share them? 
 How to put research into action? 
 The focus of the work through the Accountable Grant is research into action 
and policy, and uptake and dissemination of the experience and lessons. 
 The role of the private sector is absolutely essential. 
 BRICS will have a bigger impact on Africa through private investment, not aid. 
Richard Manning concluded the session, and highlighted a number of interesting ideas that 
merit further consideration. 
 Sharing public policy experiences is key (engaging the Rising Powers in 
technical partnerships/conversations). 
 Extract lessons for LICs (e.g. Brazil’s experience on social protection). 
 Better understanding is needed of the impact of the new dynamics generated 
by the Rising Powers in the LICs. 
 The same applies to the impact/dynamics of the New Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (Busan HLF4). 
 The BRICS are investing in infrastructure, natural resources, and trade 
relationships (Brazil, China) all of which are transformational. 
 Focus on data: there are questions of fact, not of opinion, for which we need 
concrete data. 
 Researchers must establish where the knowledge gaps and identify research 
needs: e.g. the impact of China’s rising demand, Africa–China exports  
significant ramifications. 
 Private sector: Africa is moving from being an aid destination to an investment 
destination. 
 Be wary of comparing and contrasting investment from different countries. 
 No evidence of any vast difference in the way different companies operate. 
 International cooperation – be it from the Rising Powers or not – will have an 
increasingly limited scope due to Africa’s rapid growth and its increasing 
dependence on its own tax revenue. 
 Countries are going to become less aid-dependent. 
 There is still a space for the post-Busan process to produce positive results. 
 This allows for a focused agenda with a manageable number of immediate 
objectives and deliverables for the short term. 
 Others will deliver benefits in the future, which will lead into longer-term 
conversations in the BRICS and G-20. 
 There are longer-term issues about the transformational agenda within the 
Rising Powers and the rapid rate of change in the BRICS and beyond. 
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6 Key insights for policy 
The workshop and learning event both demonstrate that the main concern is understanding 
what does and doesn’t work in development, systematising the why and how, and learning 
how to apply this to different contexts. Listed below are some of the key insights for policy 
gained from the sessions with participants from the BRICS countries, IDS and DFID. 
Use a historical approach to understanding those political, economic and social processes 
and actors that led to development gains in a national context. How did the interplay of 
design and implementation work out? 
Example: Understand how Bolsa Família went from being a municipal conditional 
cash transfer under one president, to a national programme reaching 11 million-plus 
families under the next president. 
There is never a single solution but rather a combination of solutions, hence the need to work 
collaboratively across contexts/sectors/geographies. 
Example: Poverty and inequality were reduced in Brazil through a combination of 
minimum wage, cash transfers, formal jobs, etc. 
Use this as basis for understanding ‘what works’. Develop case studies of lessons learnt and 
good practice for policy diffusion/transfers in international development, working with the 
policymakers and activists involved in the original process. 
Collaborate with diverse stakeholders in this process and not necessarily only those currently 
close to the centres of debate and decision-making: civil society, grassroots activists, 
decentralised, regional, and national governments, academics, researchers. 
Innovations often take place at the periphery – in decentralised contexts – look for innovation 
at local and municipal levels where change is often more easily achieved. 
Systematically evaluate, monitor, collate and manage evidence from partnerships and 
programmes that have been ‘successful’ – this has both domestic and international 
application, particularly since lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) may mean 
knowledge is lost with political party changes – knowledge is in people and not systems. 
Take an equally systematic approach to analysing South–South cooperation (SSC) and/or 
triangular/trilateral development cooperation (TDC) – little is yet known about the impact of 
SSC and TDC and they are not necessarily currently fit for purpose. 
Stimulate national public debate in the BRICS on their role in international development. 
Consider learning and policy transfer a two-/multi-way process: if managing inequality and 
poverty are the greatest challenges in the face of rapid growth, what applications might there 
be to ‘developed’ countries in crises? 
Help build peer review capacity for systematic monitoring and evaluation, and learning. 
Ensure that this learning process receives adequate investment and financing. 
As far as learning from the BRICS is concerned, work with the BRICS as a bloc where 
possible: development is likely to grow as an area for confluence due to reciprocal interest 
and mutual benefit rather than competition among the BRICS. 
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Use DFID’s existing capacity and long support to the private sector, an area where the 
BRICS are more homogenous in their interests if not necessarily practices – this area offers 
opportunities to engage with business and BRICS on a common level. 
Engage with the BRICS across sectors/actors at the technical level, rather than the political 
level. This is particularly relevant given the BRICS possible preference for engaging with 
multilateral institutions/cooperation channels rather than bilateral organisations. 
Work more closely through country office policy advisers in the BRICS to clarify DFID’s role, 
motivations, objectives, and desired outcomes – this is not always clear, as transpired in 
conversations with senior figures in different institutions in the BRICS. 
This may also help the BRICS to modify their stance in terms of formal participation as more 
than observers in formal spaces for global development cooperation policy and coordination 
(i.e. Busan, the post-2015 MDG debate, etc.). 
Seek to engage BRICS partners in collaboration and co-construction of global aid structures 
and policies – what would a ‘good’ (and acceptable) policy/structure look like, from the 
perspective of the BRICS? 
Note that governments in the BRICS (and civil society) are frequently more focused on their 
domestic politics and needs – which extends to foreign policy but not necessarily to aid in the 
way it is treated by the ‘North’ – hence lack of prioritisation on global development agenda 
items such as the post-MDG space. 
Use international meetings/summits as opportunities to engage with BRICS on different 
levels – thematic, geographical, political, diplomatic, etc. 
Example: Working with BRICS at Rio+20 – are green growth and climate change part 
of the mainstream development agenda, or a ‘sector/agenda’ in their own right? 
These are areas where North and South should be working closely together – green 
economy has an important role in sustainable development. 
When talking and thinking about BRICS, consider the important role civil society has had in 
social change – this is generally much more significant in Brazil or India than in the UK or the 
US, for example. Their influence, reach, and understanding of the national context and needs 
must be taken into consideration. 
These policy insights will be developed further in the ‘Policy Brief’ document RPID will 
produce for DFID. 
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Annex 1 DFID perspectives on engaging with the Rising Powers 
 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
DFID contact Laura Kelly (GPD) No DFID office in 
Russia 
Karen Mahy (India) Chris Chalmers (Beijing) Will Hines (South Africa) 
Summary   India still major focus for DFID, 
as it still has a bilateral aid 
programme (unlike in China). 
Relating DFID policy priorities 
with India is very important, e.g. 
in climate change negotiations, 
Busan, or G20 dialogues. 
DFID aims to develop a 
partnership with China and 
seek new ways to work 
together on development 
issues and related policy 
matters in countries they 
are both working in. 
No bilateral aid from DFID 
for China – focus is on 
collaboration abroad. 
Given China’s impact on 
development, DFID is 
seeking to explore and link 
shared objectives and 
develop new 
collaborations. 
Many elements of China’s 
approach are of interest 
(beyond development) and 
could evolve in future. 
UK can be one of many 
models of cooperation 
policies, and China could 
adapt ways of working as 
well. 
There is much overlap with 
DFID in China and India. 
Bottom line is there is an 
enormous opportunity to 
develop new national and 
international development 
institutions and global 
policies. 
Similarly to the other 
country offices, DFID 
South Africa is managing 
programmes as a bilateral 
donor and as a 
development partner for 
the region. 
DFID’s wide range of 
partners requires an open 
dialogue on our 
development cooperation 
model. 
The emergence of the new 
South African partnership 
provides opportunities to 
interact in new ways, 
opening talks on how to 
form partnerships with 
business, academia and 
the civil society sector. 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
DFID priorities/
Key areas of 
collaboration 
 N/A India’s role in the world and 
region 
Climate change 
Food security 
Global public goods 
India’s role in technology and 
innovations 
With respect to the private 
sector, DFID is interested in the 
developmental impact of private 
sector investment in other 
countries (e.g. access to 
medicine). 
Global public goods 
Climate change 
International health 
Regional cooperation (e.g. 
China in Africa or South 
Asia) 
International policy 
Collaboration post-Busan 
MDGs post-2015. 
South Africa’s importance 
in Africa as the largest 
economy and its influence 
in terms of regional trade, 
integration, and 
infrastructure. 
South Africa’s political role 
in BRICS and G20 as sole 
African voice in those 
spaces. 
DFID’s priorities are 
related to this in our 
bilateral and regional 
programmes: 
Support regional 
integration and trade 
(NS corridor, free trade 
with UK, and role within 
international development 
institutions) 
Climate Change 
Health (HIV, access to 
medicine, role of private 
sector). 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Challenges/
Issues 
Limited public debate on 
development. 
Brazil has significantly 
increased its 
international technical 
cooperation, but there is 
limited national debate 
about these policies. 
  The challenges faced are 
threefold: 
Programmatic: DFID 
systems don’t necessarily 
fit comfortably with 
developing partnership 
programmes with China; 
Political: many 
sensitivities around 
development agenda; 
Philosophically different 
perspectives on aid: (UK 
separates it from other 
agendas, while for China it 
is part of a package that 
includes commercial 
interests). 
All of this is underpinned 
by the need to work 
together to strengthen 
South Africa in G20 and 
the potential of BRICS in 
developed and developing 
countries. 
However, there are many 
gaps in understanding this 
aspect and how DFID can 
support it. 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Future work/
questions 
How can we stimulate 
domestic debate about 
its impact in the region? 
 How we can draw on this to take 
experience to other countries, for 
improving policies, private sector 
investment, and trade? 
Some questions to explore are: 
What can India and the UK offer 
in terms of comparative 
advantage in development and 
cooperation experiences? 
What can India offer on issues of 
international development? 
What experience does DFID 
have that could be shared? 
This group could be used to build 
on our policy dialogue and to 
take advantage of knowledge 
transfer from India, bringing 
change to policy and practice. 
In this respect, it is important to 
emphasise the evidence of 
practice and bring it into 
policymaking. 
In terms of research, 
financing and networks 
there is much that is 
specific to China, but much 
less attention on the 
BRICS as a group. 
Other very important, 
groupings include the 
middle-income countries of 
the G20. 
What is their common 
interest? Areas of potential 
collaboration? 
It is often said that there 
isn’t much in common 
between these Rising 
Powers, and that issues of 
power significantly reduce 
possibilities of 
collaboration, but from a 
sectoral or thematic level, 
there are many shared 
interests and 
commonalities that are 
interesting to explore. 
In this respect, one may 
consider the UK’s value 
and DFID’s role in 
understanding and relating 
to this reality. 
A better understanding is 
needed on South Africa’s 
role with other BRICS and 
in multilateral and bilateral 
policy, the potential of 
forming a new 
development agency, and 
South Africa’s impact with 
neighbouring countries 
(good and bad). 
It is also necessary to 
improve, collate and 
manage evidence of the 
types of partnerships that 
are constructive, and 
evaluate the impact of 
programmes and their 
attribution to DFID role. 
DFID can share models on 
a technical level, and 
initiate dialogue in a 
broader set of issues, but 
it still has much to learn. 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Participant from 
the BRICS 
Bianca Suyama  
(Articulação Sul, Brazil) 
Yuriy Zaytsev  
(HSE Russia) 
Anuradha Chenoy  
(JNU India) 
Huo Jinguo  
(CAITEC, China) 
Janis van der Westhuizen  
(Stellenbosch University) 
Country context 
overview 
Brazil has increased 
SSC, first with Latin 
America and more 
recently in Africa, sharing 
with the world the 
policies that contributed 
to the reduction of 
poverty and 
vulnerability. 
However, there is a 
problem of lack of a 
domestic policy for 
international cooperation, 
and the definition 
between being receiver 
or provider of aid. 
It has proven necessary 
to create a public 
debate and form a 
constituency inside and 
outside government to 
influence these 
changes. 
(cont’d.) 
International 
cooperation for 
development in Russia 
is uncertain. 
After the demise of the 
Soviet Union, there 
was a system of 
international 
cooperation and in the 
90s the country 
became an official 
recipient of 
cooperation in the 
context of social and 
economic reforms. 
With the presidency in 
G8, in 2007 the 
government attempted 
to establish 
mechanisms for 
international 
development 
cooperation regionally 
and sectorally. 
(cont’d.) 
Since the 1990s, there has been 
a complete shift from the central 
role of the state in development. 
This has been accompanied by a 
refocus on growth, an increased 
middle class, an increase in GDP 
and investment. 
But this has led to massive 
inequalities and uneven 
development. 
In this context, civil society in 
India has made efforts to reform 
this paradigm, achieving growth 
and equitable development. 
New open democratic spaces 
have allowed civil society to 
influence these issues (from 
legislative changes on the right 
to information and right to food, 
to new rights-based frameworks 
for policies). 
With this in mind, one must 
consider the kind of intervention 
in India’s international 
development programmes and 
increasing aid flows. 
(cont’d.) 
China is seen as a Rising 
Power from the outside, 
but this is based on high 
economic growth rates. 
This analysis centres on 
numerical indicators, 
disregarding that in other 
aspects China still has 
many challenges and is 
comparatively not as 
strong. 
Consider it ‘rising’ but not 
yet in ‘power’. 
Market system – historic in 
UK – only started in 1992 
in China, as the country 
turned gradually towards 
market-oriented reforms; 
after 10 years, China has 
barely started to build pure 
market conditions. 
More recently, problems in 
the Chinese economy 
required strong 
government intervention. 
(cont’d.) 
Janis focused on the 
specific issue of the 
context of frail democracy 
in South Africa and the 
impact and implications of 
this. 
This is related to the 
growing restraints on 
freedom of media and 
press as a result of 
corruption and fragile state 
powers. 
Civil society is attempting 
to act against this (for 
example through the Right 
to Information Law), but 
these issues are still there. 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Country context 
overview 
(cont’d.) 
In this respect, it is 
necessary to have a 
good presence of civil 
society, working on 
macro-level issues but 
also grassroots 
problems. 
In the case of Brazil civil 
society was a basic 
influence on social 
policy: a lot of public 
policies that took place in 
Brazil were possible 
precisely because of 
interaction with and the 
involvement of various 
civil society actors. 
Cooperation on the 
municipal/local level is 
now much more feasible 
and has proven to be an 
easier avenue for 
achieving changes. 
(cont’d.) 
Priority sectors 
include: energy, health 
and education. 
However Russia is in a 
very controversial 
position, as it needs to 
develop its own 
international 
development strategy 
and at the same time 
adapt to a new 
paradigm of 
international 
cooperation for 
development. 
(cont’d.) 
India’s cooperation strategy has 
rejected tied aid, as not self-
sustainable. 
Thus, they are seeking a 
different form of aid from what 
was received. This aid can be 
one of two models: 
One based on dependency, 
another on social 
transformation. The first is 
strategic, based on the interests 
of the giver and receiver; the 
second is a people’s agenda. 
The first is elite-driven, and the 
other is based on a broader 
dialogue. 
If we want the second set of 
parameters, we need civil society 
to influence the establishment of 
policies and development 
programmes. 
What is required is not aid, it is 
partnership: decentralisation, 
accountability and synergy are 
important and we can learn from 
the UK in these aspects. 
(cont’d.) 
Aware that while there are 
many difficulties for China, 
it is still big and has 
influence around the world. 
China is looking for ways 
to do more work globally, 
reducing poverty and 
increasing foreign aid. 
For example, nearly half of 
loans were invested in 
Africa through foreign aid, 
for agriculture, education, 
and housing. But this 
process is just starting. 
BRICS now have more 
common concerns and 
represent a greater share 
of global GDP. 
China is attempting to 
advance towards this 
balance; but is also 
criticised for having a 
surplus and not investing 
enough. 
So China has stimulated 
imports, trying to keep 
them balanced, and 
promoted foreign direct 
investment, pressing for 
private sector responsible 
investment. 
 
(Cont’d.) 
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 Brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Opportunities for 
engagement with 
DFID 
The central question is if 
it is possible for Brazil to 
scale up this 
development cooperation 
and what can DFID do to 
support it. 
Understanding the 
complexity of social 
change seen in the role 
and the influence of civil 
society on social policy 
would be useful for 
DFID. 
Another key area in 
which DFID works is 
innovation. However it 
has focused on the 
federal level, while much 
has been done on the 
local, municipal level 
that is valuable and 
could be shared. 
UK programmes in 
Russia are focused on 
Climate Change, 
Global Partnerships, 
and substantial work 
with academia. 
Oxfam and the British 
Council are 
contributing to expand 
the agenda of 
international 
development agenda 
in Russia, on poverty 
issues and support to 
educational and 
cultural programmes. 
While the UK has interest in 
open markets, trade and 
investment, it must also look at 
other aspects of India’s 
experience: 
Social policies within national 
context of uneven development; 
Contribution to global 
development spaces (while 
Indian ministries are not open, 
there are possibilities for 
engaging with actors in other 
spaces); 
Sharing Indian expertise in non-
communicable diseases and 
conditional cash transfers and 
exploring vast scope for 
cooperation, transferring and 
sharing these policies. 
Any process should be on an 
equal, horizontal, basis and seen 
from a heterodox approach, 
involving not one model, but 
various approaches. 
International cooperation is 
difficult given the current 
economic context, but we 
all know that in order to 
end the recession we need 
to cooperate. 
At present, China pays 
special attention to BRICS 
for cooperation. 
The world needs to discuss 
how to advance towards 
new governance – China 
and other G20 countries 
must seek a fairer 
organisation of the world. 
This is an appeal to cease 
the identification of South 
Africa as a Rising Power, 
disregarding the lack of 
democracy in the country. 
A refocus is needed on 
how we can strengthen 
domestic institutions, civil 
society and support the 
media. 
Think beyond terms of 
economic: ‘wellbeing’ 
means speaking of 
democracy: holding 
leaders accountable, 
strengthening media, 
enhancing the capacity of 
the judicial sector, among 
others. 
Anything in relation to 
these will have spillover 
into other kinds of 
development for 
cooperation. 
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Annex 2 Questions and comments 
Gerry Bloom (IDS): Is it possible to speak of mutual, shared interests of BRICS? Or perhaps 
focus on different areas and sectors where there is interest and greater possibilities for 
cooperation? 
Rajesh Tandon (Advisory Council): Two issues were not sufficiently included in the work 
plan. First, there is an assumption that what worked in India will work elsewhere: it is 
necessary to understand the political context and institutions that influenced this process, it is 
not possible to simply transfer policies. 
Second, while the BRICS have a strong civil society, it is not active in promoting domestic 
debates on these global issues; nor has it questioned the role of the Rising Powers 
externally. Little is known/studied of Indian civil society presence in international events. 
John Humphrey (IDS): Rising Powers are very heterogeneous, so what is the advantage of 
working on them simultaneously? 
The central potential is in private sector investment, an area where DFID has done a lot of 
work, for example with EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). IDS (with ODI and 
DFID) can mobilise resources to engage with businesses and BRICS on a common level. 
Richard Carey (Advisory Council): On the issue of science, technology and innovation, 
what is the impact of Rising Powers in low-income countries? 
How do LICs see it? The dynamics for LICs are very different now: there are new paradigms 
for thinking of economic development, effective states, governance issues. 
Lizbeth Navas-Alemán (IDS): It’s extremely important to champion the private sector’s 
successful experiences beyond the national level, identifying experiences of successful 
clusters that are more able to adapt. 
Rosalind Eyben (IDS): When comparing BRICS’ international cooperation policy to the 
UK’s, it is important to remember the UK’s role as a colonial power, a very different position 
from BRICS today. 
Merle Lipton (Advisory Council): What will the rules of international governance look like? 
All BRICS countries agree on the need for reform of global institutions. But are these going to 
be transformed? Or is it going to be an anarchic situation, of power moving to regional 
organisations? 
Richard Manning (Advisory Council): Are South African DFID officials pulling strings in 
different directions, from regional/bilateral? 
Li Xiaoyun (Advisory Council): What is the incentive for DFID to take such an active role in 
engaging with the BRICS? It has to do with balance: incentives are different and based on 
different interests. Another question is whether to seek cooperation on a political or technical 
level. The political level is very difficult; the technical is much more possible/feasible. DFID 
may find most BRICS prefer multilateral, institutional and micro-level cooperation. 
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Annex 3 Complete participant list & 
biographies 
Name Institution 
Partners 
 Bianca Suyama Articulação Sul 
Laura Trajber Waisbich CEBRAP – Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning 
Marina Larionova* IORI-HSE (International Organisations Research Institute – Higher School of 
Economics) (participated via tele-conference) 
Yuriy Zaytsev HSE (Higher School of Economics) (participated via tele-conference) 
Mark Rakhmangulov* IORI-HSE (International Organisations Research Institute – Higher School of 
Economics) 
Sachin Chaturvedi RIS (Research & Information System for Developing Countries) 
Anuradha Chenoy JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) 
Zhang Xiulan BNU (Beijing Normal University) 
Janis Van der Westhuizen SUN (University of Stellenbosch) 
Chris Alden SAIIA (South African Institute of International Affairs) 
Qi Gubo CAU (China Agricultural University) 
Huo Jianguo CAITEC (Chinese Academy of International Trade & Economic Cooperation) 
Advisory Council 
 Gabriele Koehler Advisory Council 
Richard Manning Advisory Council 
Romulo Paes Advisory Council 
Merle Lipton Advisory Council 
Li Xiaoyun Advisory Council 
Rajesh Tandon Advisory Council 
KY Amoako* Advisory Council (participated via tele-conference) 
Richard Carey Advisory Council 
IDS BRICS 
 Alex Shankland Research Fellow, RPID Co-convenor, Civil Society / Brazil Country Lead 
Anu Joshi Research Fellow, India Country Lead 
Deepta Chopra Research Fellow, India Country Lead 
Gerry Bloom Research Fellow, Health Lead 
Hayley MacGregor Research Fellow, South Africa Lead 
Jenny Constantine Rising Powers Research and Communications Consultant 
Jeremy Allouche Research Fellow, Global Policy component 
John Humphrey Professorial Fellow, Africa Footprint Lead 
Linda Waldman Research Fellow, South Africa Lead 
Lizbeth Navas-Aleman Research Fellow, RPID Co-convenor, Business / Brazil Country Lead 
Marc Berenson Research Fellow, Russia Country Lead 
Matthew Lockwood Research Fellow, Climate Change Team Leader, Climate Policy lead 
Robert Nurick Director of Teaching, Development Studies Learning Partnership Lead 
Rosalind Eyben Research Fellow, Global Policy Lead 
Stacey Townsend Globalisation Team Administrator / Rising Powers Workshop Organiser 
Xavier Cirera Research Fellow, Africa footprint component 
(Cont’d.) 
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Name Institution 
IDS Fellows (Other Participants) 
 Ammar Rashid MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
Felix Rottmann MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
Georgina Powell-Stephens Accountable Grant Coordinator 
Ian Scoones Research Fellow, Future Agricultures Consortium Co-convenor 
Jaqueline Berumen MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
Jim Sumberg Research Fellow, Accountable Grant Director 
Jixia Lu Visiting Fellow (STEPS) 
Lawrence Haddad Director, IDS 
Maria Persson MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
Mark Davies Research Fellow, Centre for Social Protection Manager 
Melanie Punton MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
Richard Jolly Honorary Professor and Research Associate 
Sneha Palit MA Candidate / Research Assistant 
External Invitees 
 Andrew Norton ODI (Overseas Development Institute) 
Giles Mohan OU (Open University) 
Gordon McGranahan IIED (International Institute for Environment & Development) 
Laura Collins University of Cambridge 
Lila Buckley IIED (International Institute for Environment & Development) 
Michel Carton EADI (European Association for Development Institutes) 
Robin Hart Wilton Park 
Stephany Griffith-Jones University of Columbia 
DFID 
 
Aishah Afzal Economist – Global Development Partnerships 
Anthony Smith International Relations Director 
Chintán Makwanda Policy Support 
Elinor Wakefield Rising Powers Policy Advisor 
Ella Carpenter Transparency Adviser 
Fran Drugan Africa Policy Adviser 
Karen Mahy DFID India 
Laura Kelly Head of Global Development Partnerships Programme 
Paul Wafer Senior Policy Adviser (post-2015 interest) 
Peter Gordon Policy Division (responsible for IDS Accountable Grant) 
Ranil Dissanayake Economist – Strategy Unit 
Chris Chalmers DFID China 
Billy Stewart DFID India 
Mike Ellis DFID Brazil 
Will Hines DFID South Africa 
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